The Shapley-Shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of orderings in which each player is pivotal. The Banzhaf power index depends on the number of ways in which each voter can e¤ect a swing. If the input size of the problem is n, then the function which measures the worst case running time for computing these indices is in O (n2 n ) : We present a method based on generating functions to compute these power indices e¢ciently for weighted multiple majority games and we study the temporal complexity of the algorithms. Finally, we apply the algorithms obtained with this method to compute the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices under the two decision rules adopted in the Nice European Union summit.
Introduction
The analysis of power is central in political science. In general, it is di¢cult to de…ne the idea of power, but for the special case of voting situations several quantitative measures for evaluating the power of a voter or coalition have been proposed. The two classical power indices have received the most theoretical attention as well as application to political structures. The …rst such power index was proposed by Shapley and Shubik [10] . The second power index was introduced by Banzhaf [1] and has been used in arguments in various legal proceedings. The computation of these power indices is complex in practice, because the algorithms have exponential complexity. However, using generating functions, Cantor (see Lucas [8] ), Mann and Shapley [9] , Brams and A¤uso [5] and Tannenbaum [11] have obtained signi…cant results for computing the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices in weighted voting games.
In this paper we focus on computing the Banzhaf index and the ShapleyShubik index by using generating functions for weighted multiple majority games. The interest in these games lies in that, nowadays, some international organizations which gather a diversity of countries are considering a revision of the actual voting system of quali…ed majority. So, the possible introduction of multiple majority systems to improve and simplify the current decision systems is being discussed. Section 2 brie ‡y recalls the concept of weighted m-majority games. In section 3 we compute the Banzhaf power index by generating functions for weighted m-majority games and analyze its temporal complexity. A similar study for the Shapley-Shubik index is described in section 4. In Section 5 we apply the algorithms obtained to compute both the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices under the two decision rules adopted in the Nice European Union summit, which will be used in the European Union enlarged to 27 countries.
Voting games
A simple game is a cooperative game (N; v) where N = f1; : : : ; ng is a …nite set and v : 2 N ! f0; 1g ; such that v (;) = 0 and v(S) · v(T ) whenever An important subclass of simple games is the class known as weighted voting games which are used in many voting schemes. A weighted voting game is represented by [q; w 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n ] : Here, there are n players, w i represents the voting weight of player i with 0 < w i < q; for all i; and q is the quota needed to win. We shall assume that q > 1 2 P i2N w i : In such voting games the characteristic function is de…ned by v(S) = 1 if w(S)¸q and v(S) = 0 otherwise, where w(S) = P i2S w i : We suppose that all the weights and the quota are positive integers. Given the simple games v 1 ; : : : ; v m we consider the simple game de…ned by (v 1^: : :^v m )(S) = min fv t (S) : 1 · t · mg :
A weighted m-majority game is the simple game v 1^: : :^v m where v t = £ q t ; w t 1 ; : : : ; w t n ¤ ; 1 · t · m are weighted voting games. Then
where w t (S) = P i2S w t i .
The normalized Banzhaf power index
The Banzhaf index is concerned with the number of times each player could change a coalition from losing to winning and it requires to know the number of swings for every player i (see Dubey and Shapley [6] ). A swing for player i is a pair of coalitions (S [ i; S) such that S [ i is winning and S is not. For each i 2 N; we denote by´i(v) the number of swings for i in game v; that is, the number of winning coalitions in which player i is critical. The total number of swings is´(v) = P i2N´i (v) and the normalized Banzhaf index is the vector¯(v) = (¯1(v); : : : ;¯n(v)) wherē
The most useful method for counting the number of elements f (k) of a …nite set is to obtain its generating function. The generating functionof f(k) is the formal power series
We can work with generating functions of several variables
For each n 2 N; the number of subsets of k elements of the set N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng is given by the explicit formula of the binomial coe¢cients
A generating function approach to binomial coe¢cients may be obtained as follows. Let S = fx 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n g be an n-element set. Regard the elements x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n as independent indeterminates. It is an immediate consequence of the process of multiplication that
Note that if T = ; then we obtain 1: If we put each x i = x; we obtain
We now present generating functions for computing the Banzhaf power index in weighted m-majority games. 
where b i k 1¢¢¢ km is the number of coalitions S such that i = 2 S; w t (S) = k t for all 1 · t · m: ; is given by
Proof. 1. First of all, we consider the set of all coalitions S such that i = 2 S with w t (S)¸q t ¡ w t i for all 1 · t · m: Its cardinal is given by
As w t (S [ i)¸q t ; 1 · t · m; then s i 1 coincides with the number of winning coalitions in which the player i participates.
On the other hand, inside of the set of the winning coalitions that contain player i, we consider the subset of those coalitions in which player i is not necessary to win. The cardinal of this subset coincides with the set of all coalitions S such that i = 2 S with w t (S)¸q; 1 · t · m; and it is given by
Therefore, the number of swings of player
2. Expanding the function B(x 1 ; : : : ;
Then B(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) is a generating function for the numbers b k 1¢¢¢ km where each b k 1¢¢¢ km is the number of coalitions S such that w t (S) = k t ; 1 · t · m: To obtain the numbers
, it su¢ces to delete the factor 
To compute the number of swings for each player the following di¤erences are calculated:
As the total number of swings is 10; we obtain¯(v) = (2=5; 1=5; 1=5; 1=5) :
With the aim of making easier the computation of the coe¢cients b i
we can use a table n-dimensional, to store the coe¢cients of B i (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) (for n = 2 see Fernández [7] and Bilbao et al. [4] ). If we arrange the coe¢-cients by increasing powers of x t with x t 2 f1; : : : ; mg; the element b i k 1¢¢¢ km is placed in the position (k 1 + 1; : : : ; k m + 1). For instance, the matrix that contains the coe¢cients of B 3 (x; y) is 
2. The number of terms of B i (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ); for every i 2 N, is bounded by c:
Proof. 1. A lower bound of c is obtained in the case in which the weights of all players are equal, that is
The number of terms of (1 + x w 1 1 ¢ ¢ ¢ x w m m ) n is always less or equal than the number of terms of B(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ): On the other hand, we have that
is a polynomial of degree w t (N) in x t ; 1 · t · m, and in which there are no terms such as x
Moreover, at worst, c · 2 n because all exponents of the terms of B(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) are di¤erent and then the number c coincides with the number of subsets of N.
2. It is straightforward by part 1. ¤
The time complexity function f : N ! N of an algorithm give us the maximum time f (n) needed to solve any problem instance of encoding length
We analyze our algorithms in the arithmetic model, that is, we count elementary arithmetic operations and assignments. For instance, the algorithm for computing the product of two n £ n matrices is O ¡ n 3 ¢ : We obtain pseudo polynomial algorithms, i.e. polynomial in n and c; for computing the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices. 
since f(1) = 1 and for n¸2, at worst, the computation of
requires a number of products and sums with upper bounds of 2C and C respectively, because C is a upper bound of the number of nonzero coe¢-cients of B(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ): If we leave out the notation O (¢) and expand the above recurrence, we have
2. It is straightforward by 1. ¤ Next, we describe the function m-banzhafPower which will be used to compute the normalized Banzhaf index of all players in a weighted mmajority game and we study its time complexity. Proof. In this situation, the complexity order of the function f(n) which determines the execution time of the function m-BanzhafPower; is given by
= O(max(t(loop1); n; 2n)) = O(t(loop1)):
As O(t(loop1)) = O(n(t(loop int)+t(assignment1)+¢ ¢ ¢+t(assignment5))) and taking into account that
¤
The Shapley-Shubik power index
The Shapley-Shubik index for a simple game v : 2 N ! f0; 1g is the vector ©(v) = (© 1 (v); : : : ; © n (v)) de…ned by
where each d i j is the number of swings of player i in coalitions of size j: Similar to what happens with the Banzhaf index in weighted double majority games, it is also possible to obtain, using generating functions, an analogous result for the calculation of the Shapley-Shubik power index. When the game (N; v) is given by v = v 1^: : :^v m ; where v t = £ q t ; w t 1 ; : : : ; w t n ¤ , 1 · t · m; then we have that
where a i k 1¢¢¢ km j is the number of coalitions S; with cardinal j, such that i = 2 S, and, w t (S) = k t for all 1 · t · m: 
where a k 1¢¢¢ kmj is the number of coalitions S µ N; such that jSj = j; w t (S) = k t for all 1 · t · m: To obtain the numbers a i k 1¢¢¢ kmj , it su¢ces to delete the factor
m´i n the polynomial S(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ; z); giving rise to their generating function S i (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ; z): ¤ Note that if we know the coe¢cients fa i k 1¢¢¢ kmj g k 1¸0 ;::: km¸0; j¸0 , using the polynomial S i (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ; z); then the numbers fd i j g j¸0 can be determined. These numbers can be identi…ed with the coe¢cients of a polynomial g i (z) = P n¡1 j=0 d i j z j and taking into account that
Hence, we obtain that
and by Proposition 5 we have that
The elements of S i (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ; z) can be stored in a table n-dimensional, where the element (k 1 + 1; : : : ; k m + 1) is P n¡1 j=0 a i k 1¢¢¢ k m j z j : For example, for n = 2; we have
: : : x
. . .
We determine a polynomial in z whose coe¢cients represent the winning coalitions that contain player i;
On the other hand, we consider a polynomial in z whose coe¢cients represent the number of winning coalitions that contain player i but his presence is not necessary to win,
These polynomials s i 1 (z) and s i 2 (z) are obtained by adding respectively the nonzero elements in the table, from the (q t ¡ w t i ) to the last, for all 
2. The number of terms of S i (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ; z); for every i 2 N, is bounded by c:
Proof. 1. A lower bound is obtained in the case in which the weights of all players are equal, that is,
The number of terms of (1 + z x w 1 1 ¢ ¢ ¢ x w m m ) n is always less or equal than the number of terms of
Therefore, c¸n + 1: To determine an upper bound we note that S(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ; z) =
is a polynomial of degree w t (N) in x t , 1 · t · m; degree n in z, and in which there are no terms such as z j or x k t , 1 · t · m: Therefore,
Moreover, at worst, c · 2 n because all exponents of the terms of the polynomial S(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ; z) are di¤erent and, then c coincides with the number of subsets of N. We can compute the normalized Shapley-Shubik index of all players in a weighted m-majority game, using generating functions, with the function called m-ShapleyPower.
Function m-ShapleyPower(weights 1; : : : ; weights m; q 1 ; : : : ; q m ) {weights t : list of n integers; q t : integer; 1 · t · m} 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 for i from 1 to n 2 4 for t from 1 to m list aux t Ã delete(fw t 1 ; : : : ; w t n g; w t i ) end for
output fÁ 1 ; : : : ; Á n g
We can prove to compute the normalized Shapley-Shubik index of all players in a weighted m-majority game, with the function m-ShapleyPower, a time O(n 2 c) is required, where c is the number of nonzero coe¢cients of S(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ; z).
Power indices in the European Union
We next present some results concerning to the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for the European Union enlarged to 27 countries. We compute these indices under the two decision rules adopted in the Nice European Union summit, held in December, 2000. The players are: {Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania, The Netherlands, Greece, Czech Republic, Belgium, Hungary, Portugal, Sweden, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovak Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta}.
The …rst decision rule is the weighted triple majority game v 1^v2^v3 , where the three weighted voting games corresponding to votes, countries and population, are the following:
29,29,29,29,27,27,14,13,12,12,12,12,12, 10, 10, 10, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3] ; 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 The game v 3 is de…ned assigning to every country, a number of votes equal to the rate per thousand of its population over the total population and the quota represents the 62% of the total population. So, a voting will be favorable if it counts on the support of 14 countries with at least 255 votes, and with at least the 62% of the population. Next, we give a table which contains the Banzhaf power indices of the countries if the …rst decision rule is used. In the column called Pop. I is included the percentage of population over the total, and in the column Vote I, the percentage of votes of every country over the total. The Banzhaf indices of the game v 1 are included in the column Game1, and the Banzhaf indices of the weighted triple majority game v 1^v2^v3 in the column Game3a. ² The …rst decision rule, that consists of a triple majority system, is quasi equivalent to the …rst game of quali…ed majority. The Banzhaf power of all countries is almost the same as the power with the simple game v 1 ; with the double game v 1^v2 ; and with the triple one v 1^v2^v3 .
² The second decision rule, that di¤ers from the …rst one because it requires the approval at least of 2=3 of the countries, is quasi equivalent to the weighted double majority game v 1^v 0 2 : In this rule, the required population quota to adopt a decision does not change the Banzhaf power of the countries. Table 2 contains the Shapley-Shubik indices for the …rst decision rule adopted, i.e., for the game v 1^v2^v3 ; labeled Game3a. In a similar way, in both cases, the results corresponding to the games v 1 ; labeled Game1, and v 1^v2 ; labeled Game2a are similar. The conclusion, such as we anticipated before, is that the results corresponding to the games v 1^v2^v3 and v 1^v2 are almost the same.
Countries
Population Game1 Game2a Game3a Table 3 . The power indices under the second rule Summarizing, there are two main conclusions:
1. Germany has almost the same power indices that United Kingdom, France and Italy, for the weighted triple majority game v 1^v2^v3 : the di¤erence is only 4 swings with respect to 28 millions. Concerning to the weighted triple majority game v 1^v 0 2^v 3 , the di¤erence is also 4 swings in favor of Germany, over 24 millions and a half of swings. Consequently, the distinction between the Banzhaf indices of Germany and United Kingdom, France and Italy are, respectively, smaller than 1:4 £ 10 ¡7 and 1:6 £ 10 ¡7 :
2. The two rules of triple majority, adopted in the Nice summit meeting, are almost equivalent to a game of simple majority (the …rst) or double (the second). With both rules, the required population quota to adopt a decision does not change in practice the power of the countries.
